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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract: The neoclassical case supporting competitive frames and market
solutions has failed to promote stable world-wide economic development.
Other approaches in economics incorporate social culture, increasing returns,
market power, ecological limits and complementarity, yielding broader
applications for development theory. In this paper a theory of planning
horizons is introduced to raise some meaningful questions about the
traditional view with respect to its substitution, decreasing returns and
independence assumptions. Suppositions of complementarity, increasing
returns and interdependence suggest that competition is inefficient by
upholding a myopic culture resistant to learning. Growth – though long
believed to rise from markets and competitive values – may not derive from
these sources. Instead, as civilizations advance, shifting from material wants
to higher-order intangible output, they evolve from market tradeoffs
(substitution and scarcity) into realms of common need (complementarity
and abundance). The policy implications of horizonal theory are explored,
with respect to regulatory aims and economic concerns. Such an approach
emphasizes strict constraints against entry barriers, ecological harm, market
power abuse and ethical lapses. Social cohesion – not competition – is sought
as a means to extend horizons and thereby increase efficiency, equity and
ecological health. The overriding importance of horizon effects for regulatory
assessment dominates other orthodox standards in economics and law.
Reframing economics along horizonal lines suggests some meaningful insight
on the proper design of economic systems.
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The ‘Washington Consensus’ – as the term is currently used (Williamson 2000) –
illustrates an ideological view which places privatization and competition at the
top of the social agenda for economic development. This paper raises some basic
questions about the virtues of competition, deriving from its suppositions about
human relations. Social theory in economics starts with individual wants,
independently framed and pursued. Furthermore, rivalry is seen as endemic:
competition provides the best means to reconcile opposing intentions, shaking
out those who want things most in a process of financial gain. The whole story is
founded on neoclassical theory and its view of competition as efficient in the
general case. Neoclassical economics is centrally based on substitution as the
defining characteristic of economic relations. Substitution, in turn, derives from
production under rising cost (diminishing returns). Substitution also warrants
independence assumptions (Krupp 1982, p. 390; Jennings 2007b) and the use of
equilibrium models.
The whole scheme unravels with these suppositions relaxed, to favor
complementarity, increasing returns and interdependence. In this setting, there
are no equilibria and the economy opens along a path-dependent track where
ethics and history count. The virtues of freedom and efficiency – individualism
in general – ought to be addressed differently in a post-neoclassical world; their
ramifications suggest that collaboration – not competition – may be a better
route to economic growth in a more realistic context. The aim of this paper is to
explore the optimality of free-market economies under revised assumptions, and
the social policy implications of this shift away from mainstream models of
choice.
The basic characteristic of the alternative frame proposed is an embrace of
complex interdependence – substitution and complementarity inextricably
intertwined – in an economic context of increasing returns to new output. Under
this supposition, justified by A.C. Pigou (1927, 1928) and reinforced by Nicholas
Kaldor (1972, 1975), production cannot encounter rising marginal costs save for
short-term models subject to fixed inputs and other dynamic constraints. The
underlying technology is of falling cost throughout the economy. Indeed, the
case for rising cost stands on nothing more than assertion (Jennings 2008ab,
2009c) due to the analytical limits of neoclassical theory.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 7
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Opening economics into realms of nonconvexity – as increasing returns will do –
alters many established ‘truths.’ Substitution and decreasing returns allow
equilibrium models to close, satisfying existence proofs for scientific acceptance.
So would economic ‘convenience’ set the terms for legitimate discourse at the cost
of realism. Complementarity and increasing returns are the way of our world;
this paper aims to show why and trace some meaningful lessons therefrom. The
paper is structured as follows. First, the joint importance of substitution and
complementarity in economic relations is addressed to show why substitution is
only one side of a two-sided coin where conflicts and concerts of value coexist
throughout economic phenomena. Next, the twin notions of planning horizons
and interhorizonal complementarity untangle an institutional quandary in
which cooperation – not competition – is shown as efficient. The third section to
follow will limn the growth and policy implications of a horizonal economics of
complex systems and rational limits, suggesting a post-neoclassical view of free-
market economies shaped by ethical laws, social culture and other considerations
so far ignored in neoclassical theory. The last part of the paper restates its
central conclusions and implications for economic growth and development in a
world defined by ecological limits, rational bounds, common aims and horizon
effects. So would doctrine need to evolve from competition to an inclusive frame
adopting cooperation as our route to growth and development through an
expansion of planning horizons in a new economics of information and
organizational learning.
The nature of economic relations The nature of economic relations The nature of economic relations The nature of economic relations The nature of economic relations
Substitution assumptions stand on notions of opposition as the basic
characteristic of economic interdependence: social relations are rivalrous, since
scarcity is the problem motivating individual effort to meet human needs.
Substitution and tradeoffs state the nature of our relations; such is the way of
physical goods, which either belong to you or another. The conflicts of value
assumed in this setting – associated with things as the source of economic well-
being – create a rivalrous social linkage as a means to serve common needs. So
would Smith’s (1776, p. 423) “invisible hand” deliver an optimal level of
satisfaction to the public through free trade in a market society. Although some
problems are acknowledged with this central lesson, it remains a prime
motivation for the economics of growth and development. There has always been
an underlying tension in economics, however, among immaterial outputs andFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 8
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those of physical goods. As Romer (1996, p. 204) expressed it, two types of input –
things and ideas, or atoms and bits – serve to explain growth: the ‘nonrivalry’ of
immaterial goods is seen to be important to the development process through
R&D, information and learning.
But Romer doesn’t go far enough in assuming constant and decreasing returns to
scale in things: substitution is not the only form of interdependence, even in
realms of physical output. The implications of falling cost – that transformed
economics during the 1930s debates – suggest diminishing returns are not the
long-term nature of production technology, even as noted by Adam Smith in his
pin factory illustration of virtuous specialization (Warsh 2006, p. 46). Pigou
(1927, pp. 193-97; 1928, pp. 252-56) ruled diminishing returns “impossible,” to be
“excluded completely”: “only the laws of constant or decreasing supply price … are
admissible.” Kaldor (1972; 1975, p. 348) endorsed increasing returns as the
general case in production, yielding complementarity in our relations: “The
principle of substitution … ignores the essential complementarity between …
different types of activities … which is far more important for an understanding
… of the economy than the substitution aspect.” Myrdal (1978, pp. 772-74)
outlined a similar view of “cumulative causation.” If true, then economics should
embrace substitution and complementarity in a nondecomposable mix. Standard
theory in economics seized on one form of interdependence at the expense of
another, which may be “far more important…”
The relation of value to scarcity is also at issue here. In traditional economics,
scarcity enhances worth, as with the water-diamond paradox: water is free
though needed for life when useless jewels are rare and costly. A scarcity
economics sees no problem with this scenario, whereas information network
economies suggest a blindspot in this approach. As Matthew (2001, p. 2) reported
in an essay on “The New Economy”:
‘In the networked economy, the more plentiful things become, the more valuable they
become. …Value is derived from plenitude, the concept of abundance. … Abundance is
everything. Ubiquity drives increasing returns in a networked world. In fact, the only
factor becoming scarce in a world of abundance is human attention.’
This is the fundamental difference of complementarity and substitution, of
falling and rising cost technology: the entire relation of value to scarcity vs.
abundance shifts. Due to the reproduction of information “at near-to-zero
marginal costs,” as Elsner (2004, p. 1032-33) explained: “The ‘new’ economy, thus,The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 9
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has entered a stage of informational abundance which bears little resemblance to
the conventional mainstream economic assumption of scarcity.” Quoting
Lamberton (2001, pp. 115, 117f), Elsner continued:
‘“The limitations of information as a commodity…” call for a “thoroughgoing
innovation in organizational design” to include “a very high level of collaboration.”
This renders economics a science of (…) adequate coordination mechanisms rather
than a science of individual maximization, general equilibrium and ‘optimality.’
An economics of complementarity opens some meaningful questions about
traditional models of thought. If we step back from profit and pricing to look at
human desires, why on earth would economists ever assume our social needs are
opposed? Don’t we applaud each others’ success, as I might rejoice in yours? Is
not the purpose of organization to align economic incentives into a more
harmonious social process (Jennings 2009b)? Are not emotions contagious in
their interpersonal impact? Why aren’t we helping each other succeed, instead of
competing in opposition? All these spreading effects show complementary
interdependence.
Social conscience and personal growth internalize ‘externalities’ into the
planning involved in all choice. Substitution is not the only economic
connection, nor is competition always efficient: in the presence of
complementarity, cooperation is sought. Embracing complementarity opens
economics in new ways: equilibrium may not occur in a positive-feedback system
with a path-dependent historical lineage. Complex interdependence –
substitution and complementarity – undermines acquisitive values, showing
cooperation may be preferred. The notion of planning horizons offers a way to
resolve the dilemma.
The institutional economics of planning horizons and The institutional economics of planning horizons and The institutional economics of planning horizons and The institutional economics of planning horizons and The institutional economics of planning horizons and
complementarity complementarity complementarity complementarity complementarity
The economics of substitution and tradeoffs – ‘scarcity economics’ – stands on
equilibrium models, where independence is the rule and externalities are the
exception. In any event, spillovers shall attenuate as they spread, unlike with
‘cumulative causation’ where external effects expand (Jennings 2007b). The
economics of complementarity amplifies social links, so externalities stay
uncontained. Dealing with unbounded interdependence, however, requires someFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 10
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meaningful limits upon our range of anticipation: this is how planning horizons
serve as an index of bounded rationality. A network connection of pricing effects
so will extend through planning horizons into a general case for
complementarity in economics. The argument goes as follows: first, the
individual pricing decision is examined; then its horizonal aspects are explored
and applied in network contexts. Subsequently, a vital link between our
planning horizons suggests contagious social horizon effects called
‘interhorizonal complementarity.’ After that, the post-neoclassical growth
implications of planning horizons shall be considered as well.
The Individual Pricing Decision
Decisions are not made on known results but rather among imagined projections
of outcomes based on theory. ‘If I do this, then that will occur’ expresses a causal
belief about the world derived from models selectively based on their own
‘essentials.’ Such essentials are only asserted: a theory’s acceptance shows in its
use. Selective focus is also restrictively blind to what is ignored: theories’ silence
on their omissions sums to a sweeping case for openness, multiple models and
pluralism (Jennings 2007a); we cannot see what we miss or even imagine what
we omit. The act of choice is a normative process of multidimensional causal
projection; these selective visions show an extension dependent on knowledge,
experience, self-awareness and clarity in our assumptions and applications. So
will the role of expectations suggest a linkage of prices to planning horizons in
need of formalization.
A static conception of pricing can be inferred through induction thus: a price is
set, fixing output at one point on the market demand curve (functionally
positioned through advertising, product design, etc.) over a unit cost determined
by estimating the marginal value of inputs adjusted for risk. The opportunity
cost of that price (P*) incorporates all the expected profit streams of foregone
prices on a demand curve framed by the agent,[1] trying to fit her anticipations
to the reality as it unfolds. The range of projection involved defines the planning
horizon in choice; every pricing decision has a horizonal length as well: long-
run curves in economics are more elastic than shorter-run curves. Such is the
focus of any horizonal explanation of price.
The static conception of pricing in traditional theory is deduced from first-order
conditions of profit maximization thus: P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M* • E*  E*  E*  E*  E* where M*  M*  M*  M*  M* ≡ MR = MC > 0  MR = MC > 0  MR = MC > 0  MR = MC > 0  MR = MC > 0The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 11
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is a measure of unit cost combined with a markup term E*  E*  E*  E*  E* ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡         ε ε ε ε ε*/( */( */( */( */(ε ε ε ε ε*+1) > 1 *+1) > 1 *+1) > 1 *+1) > 1 *+1) > 1
based on its own-demand elasticity         ε ε ε ε ε*  *  *  *  * ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ dlnQ/dlnP < -1  dlnQ/dlnP < -1  dlnQ/dlnP < -1  dlnQ/dlnP < -1  dlnQ/dlnP < -1. The main conceptual
change involves epistemological status: P* P* P* P* P* rises out of inductive inference from
an observed reality, based on uncertain expectation. In other words, the pricing
decision depends on belief and assertion, not on knowledge and definite truth;
the explanation entails a horizonal range in its suppositions. So must the run
length of cost and demand curves – often derived deductively – be inductively
inferred from price-setters’ planning horizons. The relation of price to planning
horizons can be stated thus: dP*/dH* < 0 dP*/dH* < 0 dP*/dH* < 0 dP*/dH* < 0 dP*/dH* < 0 with d d d d d2 2 2 2 2P*/dH* P*/dH* P*/dH* P*/dH* P*/dH*2 2 2 2 2 > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0.[2]
As Matthew (2001, p. 2) said, “the only factor becoming scarce in a world of
abundance is human attention.” Indeed a planning horizon (H* H* H* H* H*) exists in every
act. Though H* H* H* H* H* is unobservable, our projections have a range for each
contingent track considered in a balancing of awareness among competing
demands. Attention is selective and scarce, so our choice of essentials counts: if
frames don’t fit to applications (due to rigid assumptions), then our planning
horizons shorten relative to what they might have been. The case for realistic
conceptions shows in horizon effects, stemming from inappropriate theories. This
paper reports an example in neoclassical claims.
Planning horizons serve as an aid to thinking about decisions and foresight. But
H* H* H* H* H* is ordinal; ‘wits’ are innumerable, like ‘utils’ (Boulding 1966, pp. 22-23). So
we speak of ‘horizon effects’ as changes in planning horizons, without exact
calibration. The relation of P* P* P* P* P* to H* H* H* H* H* is seen in the following way: the longer
the planning horizon – due to internal factors (such as self-confidence,
knowledge, effort and energy) and to external factors (such as stability of the
decision environment, trust in others’ reliability, and a lack of surprise) – the
lower will be the marginal cost (M* > 0 M* > 0 M* > 0 M* > 0 M* > 0), the markup (E* > 1 E* > 1 E* > 1 E* > 1 E* > 1) and the price,
where P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M*  P* = M* • E*  E*  E*  E*  E* applies to all market forms. Perhaps Margolis (1960, pp.
531-32) said it the best; his statement is one in a long debate about time in
relation to cost:[3]
‘… The greater the uncertainty … the shorter … the planning horizon and the greater
… the … costs… The implications … are that the greater the ignorance of the market
the higher … the estimate of the costs and the more inelastic the estimate of demand.
What price should a firm charge if it has hopes of … expanding its market? The
higher the price the greater the expected short-run profits and the greater the
sacrifice of expected information about the mass market. The lower the price the
more information it gains about the future market possibilities.’Frederic B. Jennings, Jr. 12
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A useful way to intuit the relation of planning horizons to price is that the
planning horizon in choice is like the ‘move horizon’ in chess (Jennings
2009b).[4] Standard assumptions – of free agents, known outcomes, stable wants
– do not apply in chess. One must abstract from positions to address the problem
of chess (or of oligopoly too). Chess is a process of planning in the face of
strategic contingencies shifting with each turn. Outcomes are projected
uncertainly, and the purpose – to win – neither restricts nor requires actions
sufficiently to identify moves. The field of chess is as much an opponent’s style of
play as the board. The chessboard demands a different approach to understanding
choice than neoclassical theory allows.
The better tradeoffs are understood and near-move contingencies culled, the
more moves ahead can a player project. The stress here is on planning in
unpredictable changing conditions. Choices in chess are path dependent,
spatially interdependent and irreversible, as in real life. One must step back
from moves on a chessboard to analyze its economics: the move horizon in chess
is analogous to the time horizon in choice. But time horizons are only extended
by knowledge of other relations, so planning horizons remain the focus.
Planning horizons serve as an ordinal index of ‘savvy’ in practical life, framing
the degree of ‘appropriateness’ of applications.
Formally, one can think of these static constructions (setting P* as the product
of M* and E*) as members of a horizonal family. Cost and demand curves shift
with horizon effects in predictable ways, since longer-run curves, ceteris paribus,
are more elastic (or flatter) than shorter-run curves. If each static graph is on a
transparency in a horizonal file drawer (with longer horizons toward the back),
the horizonal part of Figure One is a side view of that file tracking P* and M*
for different H*s (while leaving Q* implicit). See Figure One below.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 13
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Figure One Static and horizonal pricing
The Interrelations of Pricing Decisions
But Figure One only describes single price-setting agents, with no account of
externalities (pecuniary or otherwise). In neoclassical theory, aggregation from
individual prices to group patterns is set by industries, which impose
substitution by fiat. This is fine for beer vs. wine in the context of having a
drink, but fails for wine, beer, cheese and pretzels when the choice is to party or
not.[5] A transportation network captures the problem in a more flexible way;
that is where Chamberlin’s work on monopolistic competition began (Chamberlin
1961).[6]
In this setting, concern should focus on externality issues, on the impact of any
particular price on the profits of other price-setters, either ceteris paribus for
their prices or mutatis mutandis. Either way, net interdependence within any
group with respect to P P P P Pj j j j j is the difference between an uncompensated P P P P Pj j j j j* * * * * and P P P P Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′
adjusted for external profit effects. The impact of P P P P Pj j j j j on any firm i i i i i≠j j j j j’s profit is
simply s s s s si i i i i≠j j j j j         ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ (Q  (Q  (Q  (Q  (Qi i i i i≠j j j j j/Q /Q /Q /Q /Qj j j j j)  )  )  )  ) • (P  (P  (P  (P  (Pi i i i i≠j j j j j* - M * - M * - M * - M * - Mi i i i i≠j j j j j*)  *)  *)  *)  *) ····· [  [  [  [  [ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij*/( */( */( */( */(ε ε ε ε εj j j j j*+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)], so net effects are a
combinatorial S S S S SI I I I I =   =   =   =   = Ω Ω Ω Ω Ωs s s s si i i i i≠j j j j j.[7] Thus, P P P P Pj j j j j* = P * = P * = P * = P * = Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′ + S  + S  + S  + S  + SI I I I I: if S S S S SI I I I I < 0  < 0  < 0  < 0  < 0 then we have net
substitution (‘negative feedbacks’) within this group with respect to price P P P P Pj j j j j; thisFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 14
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is much like an industry model. But with S S S S SI I I I I > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0, we have net complementarity
(or ‘positive feedbacks’). The interdependence within any group with respect to a
single member can thus be expressed in general terms unrestricted by industry
aggregation.[8]
But now, without blinders of substitution, we find an institutional problem.
With substitution, competition will lead to greater output: that is the orthodox
story, where P P P P Pj j j j j* < P * < P * < P * < P * < Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′. Yet among complementarities, collusion augments
output and growth; rivalry yields scarcity here, with P P P P Pj j j j j* > P * > P * > P * > P * > Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′. Any
institutional system, be it competitive or cooperative, enhances substitutes –
starving complements – or just the reverse. This is why intangibles suffer in
adversarial systems. Sadly, we must choose, at the (invisible) cost of foregone
options.
Rivalrous social incentives stifle complementary output. A nondecomposably
intertwined tangle of substitutes and complements sets up a problem of policy
choice: which is more important, substitution or complementarity? Do we know?
Have we studied the question? Can we design our institutions for competition
across substitutes and collusion among complements, when that distinction is so
preference- and purpose-specific? Is there a way around this problem of
interdependent typologies?
In the formal analysis of a transportation network context, the term S S S S SI I I I I expresses
the balance of substitution and complementarity in any group with respect to
one member. The question to ask concerns the impact of a horizon effect – for
longer or shorter, wider or narrower, better or worse – on that balance (S S S S SI I I I I). This
question has an answer, under one important condition of interhorizonal
complementarity. Interhorizonal complementarity means that private horizon
effects spread contagiously outward to cause social horizon effects. Your
reliability invites me to become more predictable: learning and understanding
are local public goods in this sense. Such is also the chessboard problem: masters’
move horizons shrink against duffers since more dumb plays are made.[9] The
interpersonal interdependence of planning horizons is complementary:[10] you
are a disturbance term in my decision environment. We are role models for each
other; we all learn through imitation: horizon effects spread through novel
ideas, structures and designs. That is the nub of Romer’s (1996, p. 204) point on
‘nonrival’ ideas.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 15
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So what effect does interhorizonal complementarity yield on the interrelation of
prices and output? This is the key to horizonal theory: longer planning horizons
– social or private – change economic relations in favor of complementarity and
away from substitution: dS dS dS dS dSI I I I I/dH /dH /dH /dH /dHj j j j j* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 in the general case.[11] Simply put,
horizonal lengthening alters social relations away from conflict toward a
concert of interest: this is achieved through wider internalization of
externalities, and through greater rationality undermining coercive force.
Longer horizons expand the alignment of social and personal goals;[12] they also
improve ecological health through an activation of conscience, and they draw
individuals into a more cooperative frame of mind (Jennings 2003). The lesson of
planning horizons is the importance of complementarity in any economic
culture (Jennings 2008a).
Under increasing returns in production – at least according to Kaldor (1972,
1975) – reciprocity overrules substitution in human affairs. Acknowledging ‘bits’
along with ‘atoms’ strengthens the argument too. Introducing horizon effects and
interhorizonal complementarity – as a new form of interdependence – seals the
case for complementarity as our dominant tie. If so, then neoclassical theory has
misspecified human relations as rival, licensing competition as optimal in
economics. Such should yield to complementarity and cooperation, calling for
new economic conceptions and methods, some of which shall be explored
(Jennings 2003, 2008a).
The growth and social policy implications of The growth and social policy implications of The growth and social policy implications of The growth and social policy implications of The growth and social policy implications of
complementarity complementarity complementarity complementarity complementarity
An economics of complementarity – as a ‘positive feedback’ system – overturns
some long-held techniques and doctrines in economics. Substitution,
independence and additivity can’t be assumed; the efficiency case for competition
transforms into one for cooperation. Economic growth through learning is
stimulated by reciprocity, not through rivalrous social incentives. Ecological
losses show another reflection of myopia due to competitive frames. Substitution
assumptions are responsible for economic crises stemming from ethical lapses,
social conflict and narcissistic cultures – stimulating questions about the
incentives in academic communities (Jennings 2007a). Information exchanges
seem more reciprocal than they are rival, implying competition in education
ought to reduce social welfare: rivalry undermines complements, just likeFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 16
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collusion of substitutes. If human relations are complementary, competition
divides society and detracts from growth. Guided by orthodox economics, we are
raping the earth for immediate gain at a cost of future reserves set beyond our
horizon. Is it not time to address shortsightedness as an economic concern, in all
its savage effects on well-being?
Economic growth is horizonal in its central lineage (Jennings 2009a). Figure
Two illustrates how an extension of planning horizons shows up in higher rates
of output growth at micro and macro levels, through a number of factors already
explained along with the impact of planning horizons on time-preference and
discount rates. First, a longer planning horizon implies an increase of patience,
so a reduced time-preference for individuals spreads across society yielding a fall
in discount rates. Almost by definition, savers and lenders are more patient than
borrowers, such that the process of finance is a Pareto-efficient exchange
equilibrating marginal rates of impatience and therewith discount rates. Those
with long horizons and ample assets will likely lend to those who want money
now even at the cost of a larger payback later. Social planning horizons are
reflected in ‘natural’ interest rates in free market economies. If so, then longer
horizons will lead to reduced discount rates – more rapid development – ceteris
paribus for nonhorizonal realms. A formalization of this analysis shows an
ordinal linkage of longer horizons to lower rates of interest, thus to higher rates
of growth. The whole scenario is summarized in Figure Two below.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 17
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Legend for Figure Two Legend for Figure Two Legend for Figure Two Legend for Figure Two Legend for Figure Two
Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1 Case 1: Here (P P P P P1 1 1 1 1*,Q *,Q *,Q *,Q *,Q1 1 1 1 1* * * * *) is set with a short horizon (H H H H H1 1 1 1 1* * * * *), yielding a high
discount rate (r r r r r1 1 1 1 1* * * * *), high price (P P P P P1 1 1 1 1* * * * *) and low output (Q Q Q Q Q1 1 1 1 1* * * * *).
Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2 Case 2: :: : : Here (P P P P P2 2 2 2 2*,Q *,Q *,Q *,Q *,Q2 2 2 2 2* * * * *) is set with a long horizon (H H H H H2 2 2 2 2* * * * *), yielding a low
discount rate (r r r r r2 2 2 2 2* * * * *), low price (P P P P P2 2 2 2 2* * * * *) and high output (Q Q Q Q Q2 2 2 2 2* * * * *). But the observed
effects are srQ srQ srQ srQ srQ2 2 2 2 2* * * * * which is growing at g g g g g2 2 2 2 2* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 toward the ‘target’ Q Q Q Q Q2 2 2 2 2* * * * * at P P P P P2 2 2 2 2* * * * * on
the long-run demand curve LRD LRD LRD LRD LRD. The macroeconomic effects operate through
the impact of H* H* H* H* H* on the discount rate r* r* r* r* r* affecting the aggregate growth rate of
Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*.
Figure Two A horizonal representation of economic growth
But there is another relevant aspect of horizonal growth that involves a shift
from substitution to complementarity in our relations. Indeed, that horizonal
lengthening augments complementarity over rivalry in our social affairs
suggests that economic development transforms substitutes into complements in
some meaningful way outside the purview of orthodox standards. Such is the case
in Maslow’s (1954, 1968) psychology of self-actualization, where we evolve from
materialistic concerns to intangible aspirations in a process of maturationFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 18
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thwarted by opposition and conflict. Argyris (1971, pp. 262-63, 268-69) showed
the effects of institutional leadership practices in conventional organizations
that treat their members like children: mature individuals in these settings show
symptoms of poor mental health, including a sense of “frustration, failure, short
time perspective and conflict.” A loss of system integrity often ensues through a
breakdown of vital loyalties: “The nature of the formal principles of
organization causes the subordinates, at any given level, to experience
competition, rivalry, intersubordinate hostility and to develop a focus toward
the parts rather than the whole.”
As McGregor (1960, p. 310) reported in a well-known management theory
article:
‘The deprivation of needs has behavioral consequences. … The man whose needs for
safety, association, independence or status are thwarted is sick, just as surely as he
who has rickets. We will be mistaken if we attribute … passivity, or … hostility, or …
refusal to accept responsibility to … inherent ‘human nature.’ These forms of
behavior are symptoms of illness – of deprivation of … social and egoistic needs.’
McGregor (1960, p. 311) went on to explore the connection to rampant
consumerism in a distinctly Maslowian argument on the progression of human
needs from materialism to intangibles, and on the effect of frustrating personal
growth through control:
‘…the fact that management has provided for these physiological and safety needs has
shifted the motivational emphasis to the social and egoistic needs. Unless there are
opportunities at work to satisfy these higher-level needs, people will be deprived; and
their behavior will reflect this deprivation. … People will make insistent demands for
more money under these conditions. It becomes more important than ever to buy the
material goods and services which can provide limited satisfaction of the thwarted
needs. Although money has only limited value in satisfying many higher-level needs,
it can become the focus of interest if it is the only means available.’
The social evolution from rivalry to reciprocity associated with longer horizons
spawns a need for cooperation that – if frustrated – mutates into materialism
and a myopic culture. Another way of expressing the point is that competition is
keeping horizons short due to its stifling of intangible outputs such as learning,
and is making us socially immature, reinforcing narrow interests at the expense
of human development, social conscience and personal growth. Indeed, all
immaterial outputs – such as love, ethics, honor, integrity and ecological healthThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 19
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– thrive under reciprocity. All are complementary outputs stimulated by
cooperation and its successful alignment of social incentives in favor of ‘higher’
ends (in Maslow’s sense of that term). Acquisitive values are not the means to
longer horizons and growth; they are a sign of competitive failure, as McGregor
and Argyris said. The inefficiencies of competition appear in horizon effects, so
elude the exclusive focus of a neoclassical lens. Substitution assumptions –
simply asserted along with decreasing returns – serve us ill in this setting,
though we cannot see their effect without any theory of planning horizons.
The aim of social incentive design needs to move beyond competition into a more
reciprocal frame, as a means to longer planning horizons through learning and
organization, by engineering a closer alignment of private rewards with public
concerns. This alignment process – so well described in the management
literature (e.g., cf. note 12 above) – relates not only to firms but across social
systems and cultures. All living ecologies offer examples of complementary
systems savaged by competition in its fragmentation of effort. There are many
other realms suggesting competitive failures (still invisible in neoclassical
theory) due to perverse horizon effects. All imply a need to shift away from
prevailing cultural attitudes standing on substitution assumptions to a
cooperative frame encouraging greater maturity and generosity. Orthodox
standards in economics impose staggering costs, showing up in horizon effects
spreading across social milieux.
Social welfare implications Social welfare implications Social welfare implications Social welfare implications Social welfare implications
So what are the social welfare implications of this approach? A high priority
ought to be a lengthening of our planning horizons, achieved through a
stabilization of economic decision environments – such as under rules of law
rather than through bureaucratic controls – and a shift from rivalrous systems
to an emphasis on community, ethics and trust in culture and organization.
Acquisitive values have failed to produce social harmony or ecological health:
the long-term viability of the earth is being compromised by a competitive frame
perceived as socially optimal due to economists’ stubborn denial of vital lacunae
in neoclassical theory: an economics of complementarity yields very different
conclusions than does our rigid doctrine of substitution. A few remarks on how
an economics of complementarity invites social policy innovation toward
development are appropriate, though it ought to be understood that these areFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 20
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only brief observations. There is work to be done. The four issues of concern are
sources of social welfare: efficiency, equity, ecological health and horizonal
growth.
Efficiency
Much has already been said on efficiency, on the importance of longer planning
horizons for reduction of costs and markups, so economic growth may arise from
better procedures and prices. But this is only a small part of what economists
mean by ‘efficiency.’ In any dynamic complex system of interdependent
transactions, it is the ‘fit’ of frames to their applications shaping effort to need.
A consonance of theory and use is a matter of ‘realism’ in the assumptions stating
the ‘ifs’ surrounding our ‘then’ conclusions in policy choice. Substitution
assumptions shall not apply in complementary settings such as in education,
ecology and human relations. Competitive failures shall ensue, with outcomes
straying from what we expect. This shows a need for systems approaches in
economic analysis (Jennings 1999, 2009b).
Perhaps an example of positive feedback can help present the problem. If we
assume opposition of interests and design society on a premise of its members’
selfishness, such shall be the result. The very fact that we ignore each others’
well-being in normal life, frames social behavior into egocentric concerns, so
will keep us socially immature, reducing conscience and generosity. If no one
else cares, we look out for ourselves and thereby reap what we sow. As Senge
(1990, p. 274, quoting Badaracco and Ellsworth 1989) noted, the belief “that
people are motivated by self-interest and by … power and wealth” is “self-
fulfilling” in its effects:
‘If people are assumed to be motivated only by self-interest, then an organization
automatically develops a highly political style, with the result that people must
continually look out for their self-interest in order to survive. An alternative
assumption is that, over and above self-interest, people truly want to be part of
something larger than themselves. … When organizations foster shared visions, they
draw forth this broader commitment and concern.’
In other words, our aspiration levels affect our behavior in profound and
dramatic ways, either for better or for worse. If we expect too little then
mediocrity is what we get. The fit of frames to reality – although avoided by
many economists (Boland 1984, p. 174) – seems a key to horizonal lengtheningThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 21
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and to greater efficiency. In a darkening age of anti-intellectual arrogance and
troublesome methodological ignorance, it should not surprise us to find
disturbing elementary errors in economic conceptions. The putative virtues of
competition appear in its short-run effects, where its suppositions best apply. As
soon as we step beyond the immediate term into a larger realm, microeconomic
policy ought to examine entry barriers, organization and other related domains
for perverse horizon effects. There is much work to be done on the efficiency
implications of horizonal economics.
Equity
The equity issues so introduced also challenge orthodox standards, since a more
inclusive view reveals an ethical linkage of private and social welfare results
suppressed in neoclassical theory (Jennings 2005a, 2007b, 2009c). Again, our
rivalrous structures show acquisitive values and narcissism because Smith’s
invisible hand deems selfishness a public good. Diminishing returns support this
claim; increasing returns suggest instead that power rules over equity in and
beyond the firm. But this is only a start to the problem manifest in acquisitive
values, short horizons and the role of power relations in economics. Marginal
productivity theory only operates smoothly in the presence of substitution and
decreasing returns to scale. Among complements, some other representation of
free markets applies, stated well by Nelson (1981, pp. 1053-55):
‘If factors are complements, growth is superadditive. … The growth of one input
augments the marginal contribution of others. Where complementarity is important,
it makes little sense to try to divide up the credit for growth, treating the factors as
if they were not complements. … In short, there are not neatly separable sources of
growth, but rather a package of elements all of which need to be there.’
In other words, when “one input augments the … contribution of others,” these
sources “are not … separable” but must be considered together. In this situation,
power rules for redistributing income at the expense of equity and the poor.
Short horizons imply executive salaries are inflated, that labor – in the absence
of unions – shall be exploited as well. In a less myopic world, the outcome might
be different, due to a shift of values away from greed to a larger ethical realm.
Myopic cultures differ from more enlightened domains in this sense.
Why? Longer horizons suggest a more resilient social conscience, and a
recognition that our fortunes are linked in a positive way. In this situation, weFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 22
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look out for each other, understanding that in a complementary world, ‘what
goes around, comes around’ too. With common interests, your misfortunes
become my own as well as we thrive and decline together. Rewards in a
competitive frame, maladapted to our well-being, encourage just the sort of
behavior resistant to cooperation, where we all must work together on a better
outcome for all. The insights stemming from complementarity open numerous
avenues for reform in economics, and for research into how equity yields
economic growth. These issues stand at the center of any horizonal economics.
Ecological health
All ethical and ecological losses are horizonal, almost by definition. If what we
do ripples outward forever, as is the case with complementarity, it is our range
of accurate anticipation that determines well-being. An economics of
substitution defines itself as short-term theory, at the expense of foresight and
ecological viability. This is why economists turned away from meaningful long-
term problems to narrowly-focused short-term equilibria and determinate choice.
Subjectivity is excluded from mainstream models in economics; ‘objectivity’
opened a means to examine tradeoffs and draw conclusions without the
confounding effect of complexity or rational limits. So ethics, organization and
planning horizons are ignored, despite the enduring impact of vital living
ecologies on our existence. Substitution assumptions shall not apply in
complementary settings such as ecosystem management (Jennings 1999, 2003,
2005b): the harm done by competition to the diversity of all life forms – so to
our resilience in the face of global change – has been tragic and disastrous. So
one shudders to think of future generations’ opinion of us, squandering goods in
narcissistic consumption that we should keep for them, once they inherit a world
deflowered by our rapacious savagery.
Substitution assumptions imply equilibrium is self-contained, so externalities
simply attenuate and thus can be ignored. The reality in a complex system of
cumulative causation is that spillovers grow as they emanate outward from
individual acts. If so, externalities are important: the role of ethics in economics
becomes central and not superfluous. Smith’s invisible hand does not work in
this situation. Interhorizonal complementarity offers a nice solution to our
ecological crisis if we replace substitution with integration and develop policies
suited to more mature adults. Such shall lend to longer horizons, so a better fitThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 23
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of frames to the complementary universe of all living systems. An individual
effort to extend one’s planning horizon will lead to contagious social horizon
effects spreading outward to others. Systems should be designed to favor
reciprocity over rivalry and horizons will lengthen accordingly. Too many
incentive structures in neoclassical theory extol the virtues of fragmentation and
disaggregation of firms (and decisional agents) in the presence of substitution,
while an ecology is an integral balance of interlinked complementarities all of
whose components must be in place for the whole process to work. Cooperation is
the key to ecological health, as it is to horizonal growth.
Horizonal growth
The failures of neoclassical theory arise from its substitution assumptions
standing on diminishing returns which were never more than asserted (Jennings
1985, 2008ab). The ‘objectivity’ of economics (as scientific criterion) does not
tally with the personal nature of all human cognition (Polanyi 1958).[13]
Economics – indeed all learning – is subjective and open-ended; there is no way
that deterministic concepts shed any insight to the analysis of volitional action
in nonlinear realms. Subjective features show in every aspect of social life;
failing to include them makes pseudo-scientific constructions spurious in any
study of choice. Subjectivity is where we live in emotion, attitude, thought and
belief; fundamental lacunae emerge without these psychological links. We
achieve horizonal growth through realistic conceptual structures set in
conditions that meet the facts; H* H* H* H* H* is an ordinal ‘measure of fit’ of theory to truth
in this sense. In other words, if the essential ‘ifs’ surrounding a model of
outcomes hold, then that framework carries a longer horizon than otherwise. It
is precisely the correspondence between our images and the reality (to which we
have no direct access) that determines our planning horizons, along with the
time, energy and attention that we devote to our acts.
Stable social environments – such as achieved through cooperation – allow
extension of (both private and social) planning horizons in choice. Such
financial crises as exist today in our world derive from myopic cultures spawned
by competition’s short horizons. Successful learning is also important to
horizonal growth and may be encouraged by instituting cooperative frames in
education. Indeed, the primary cause of myopia and disengagement in our
economy is our system of education in its competitive values. CompetitionFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 24
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discourages output of complementary goods, such as in social learning
communities. For example, look at the worldwide media that displace substance
with frivolous strife. Freeing economics from erroneous substitution assumptions
shall lead to changes in our apprehension of social laws and their effects,
specifically of planning horizons and their role in growth. This study offers but
a first step to a new economics full of research potential.
Summary and conclusions
This paper reviewed the economics of planning horizons, stating a case for
complementarity as the essence of human relations. Economists’ substitution
assumptions have led us severely astray if increasing returns are the way of our
world throughout production technology (Jennings 2008b). Even without this
supposition, the case for reciprocity of intangibles is strong: ideas or bits are
more than ‘non-rival’; they are reciprocal and complementary in their relations.
Scarcity yields to abundance in this setting, calling for coordination through
institutional engineering of vital living systems standing on integrative frames
supporting collaboration and trust. The introduction of planning horizons and
interhorizonal complementarity into this scheme makes substitution alone
obsolete: the balance of substitution and complementarity among goods and
activities shifts with horizon effects, either for good (to reciprocity) or for bad
(toward opposition). Indeed, to know that rivalrous systems starve intangible
outputs steers our attention to a myopic culture resulting from mainstream
views. Some management theory was cited to show why organizational stress
engenders symptoms of failure, rivalry, immaturity, conflict, disengagement,
disintegration, dishonesty and myopic concerns, suggesting questions about the
social impact of a competitive frame. Many insights support an economic
conclusion that neoclassical theory – especially in its singleminded endorsement
of rivalry – undermines social integrity, ecological health and human well-
being.
Competition is not the welfare ideal limned by orthodox standards. Sadly, it is
the problem; many economists have mistaken this poison for a cure, if the ‘force
locomotif’ (Romer 1996, p. 204) of growth is really horizonal in its source
(Jennings 2009a). If so, an economics of free markets based on competitive virtue
is untenable in its assumptions. Such a conclusion opens some meaningful
lessons in need of further research. For example, how many economists study theThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 25
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economics of complementarity in its analytical limits or ramifications? The
social policy implications of complementarity open a case for: role model effects;
spreading ethical and ecological links; systems theory; integration; network
conceptions: all stretching beyond the orthodox standards of neoclassical theory.
Indeed, the favored tools of orthodoxy – additivity, econometrics, simple linear
relations, static constructions – shrink in importance in any dynamic complex
system. A need for more understanding of these subjects is stunningly urgent,
most especially with regard to war and ecological health.
The ‘Washington Consensus’ said development turned on free markets, smoothly
operating competitively in an open economy. Yet if increasing returns serve as
our rule and not the exception, then the importance of market power, regulation
and democratic control lacerate the imagined delusions of free market theory.
Indeed, the elusive freedom of opportunity offered by open rivalry – in an
economic context dominated by market power and other (so-called)
‘imperfections’ – simply is an illusion, just like competition is said to motivate
effort and achievement though other disciplines see it differently.[14]
Economists seem to avoid difficult topics showing categorical limits surrounding
conventional views, opening questions about our resilience in evolving global
settings starved for enlightened discussion. Why are we economists so resistant to
any novel departures from mainstream models and methods? Is the academic
community – organized for rivalry – undermining innovation and the
development of new ideas due to its self-protective focus on traditional views
(Jennings 2007a)?
Substitution assumptions have no application to complementarities, such as in
educational, ethical and ecological realms. Selective focus entails
simultaneously an exclusive blindness: theory is silent on what it ignores and we
only see opportunity costs through one theoretical lens at a time. Substitution
assumptions show collusion as socially harmful; if we never relax suppositions
and test them against some alternative frame – by adopting multiple models in a
pluralistic approach – then new options shall not be uncovered. There is no way
to encounter our own intellectual limits save by exploring unfamiliar
realms;[15] single-minded doctrines stay imprisoned in their own box.
Substitution assumptions and their ramifications should be challenged to move
beyond the competitive failures in neoclassical theory. Yet this suggests that
academic communities should evolve from management systems based on
competition to a more cooperative frame in order to restore resilience andFrederic B. Jennings, Jr. 26
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diversity in their research. Otherwise substitution assumptions shall not be
overturned.
The ideology of free markets should deal with its simplifications and not deny
their reality. Any honest discipline ought to welcome open discussion of
challenges to its central ideas, instead of forcing them out of frame. A strategy
of fierce opposition to innovation is symptomatic of a rivalrous system
maladaptively imposed; the only way out of this self-contained trap is by
entertaining alternatives. Social policies standing on orthodox suppositions have
failed due to their improper application, nailed in place by a pattern of stubborn
denial spurred by rivalrous social incentives. So would a disciplinary inertia
undermine development – to disastrous social effect – unwilling to fathom its
own intellectual limits.
Substitution is not the only form of economic connection; indeed, it may be a
special case in an open domain of complementarity. An organizational question
turns on their relative force in diverse settings, such that designing institutions
for efficiency is not possible without defining their relevance to any given
application. ‘If all one has is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail,’ while
the earth and our economy operate much more like a flower! Opposition is not
the answer where human aims are aligned; the twin realms of intangibles and
horizons are of this sort. This is why a competitive frame may encourage short-
term output at the expense of foresight, long-run growth and human
development. The nature of economic relations – and their representation as
substitution or complementarity – is elementary in economics, so an erroneous
specification thereof falsifies everything else. As Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
(1970, p. 9) warned, “the history of every science, including that of economics,
teaches us that the elementary is the hotbed of the errors that count most.” Is it
not yet time for renewal and to relax substitution assumptions, even to welcome
a novel approach based on planning horizons? Our relative ignorance of these
issues should be an impetus for research, and not for rigid denial in an
economics of growth and development. Thus shall we progress…
Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] Herbert Simon (1981, p. 103) remarked on neoclassical avoidance of
subjective factors in economic analysis thus (also cf. note 13):The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 27
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‘There is a certain arbitrariness in drawing the boundary between inner and outer
environments of artificial systems. …We might well have considered the business
firm’s cost function to be part of the inner environment. Instead we abstracted the
decision-making process from the production technology and regarded only the limits
on rational calculation as inner constraints on adaptivity. The cost function was
treated, along with the demand function, as part of the outer environment to which
the firm was seeking to adapt.’
[2] This finding can be derived – if done properly – from Alchian’s (1959) nine
propositions on cost, despite the erroneous effort by Hirshleifer (1962) and its
acceptance by Oi (1967) and Alchian (1968): cf. Jennings (1985, ch. 5).
Formally, M*  M*  M*  M*  M* ≡ MR = MC  MR = MC  MR = MC  MR = MC  MR = MC at Q* Q* Q* Q* Q* (the maximum profit condition), with
E*  E*  E*  E*  E* ≡ [  [  [  [  [ε*/( */( */( */( */(ε*+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)] where E*>1 E*>1 E*>1 E*>1 E*>1 because - - - - -∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ <   <   <   <   < ε* < -1 * < -1 * < -1 * < -1 * < -1 [and here ε         ≡ dlnQ/dlnP   dlnQ/dlnP   dlnQ/dlnP   dlnQ/dlnP   dlnQ/dlnP ≡
(dQ/Q)/(dP/P) (dQ/Q)/(dP/P) (dQ/Q)/(dP/P) (dQ/Q)/(dP/P) (dQ/Q)/(dP/P), the elasticity of demand, which can be thought of as the
percentage response of Q Q Q Q Q to a one-percent increase in P P P P P]. This expression can be
derived very simply by substitution from the definition of MR MR MR MR MR as dR/dQ dR/dQ dR/dQ dR/dQ dR/dQ
(where R  R  R  R  R ≡ PxQ  PxQ  PxQ  PxQ  PxQ) with respect to Q Q Q Q Q or P P P P P, which can be written simply as
P = MR x [ P = MR x [ P = MR x [ P = MR x [ P = MR x [ε /(  /(  /(  /(  /(ε+1)] +1)] +1)] +1)] +1)], yielding P* = M* x E* P* = M* x E* P* = M* x E* P* = M* x E* P* = M* x E*, where the asterisk (* * * * *) denotes
the level actually chosen as best by an agent. The horizonal outcome is
summarized thus: dM*/dH < 0 dM*/dH < 0 dM*/dH < 0 dM*/dH < 0 dM*/dH < 0 with d d d d d2 2 2 2 2M*/dH M*/dH M*/dH M*/dH M*/dH2 2 2 2 2 > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0; dE*/dH < 0 dE*/dH < 0 dE*/dH < 0 dE*/dH < 0 dE*/dH < 0 with
d d d d d2 2 2 2 2E*/dH E*/dH E*/dH E*/dH E*/dH2 2 2 2 2 > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0; so dP*/dH <  dP*/dH <  dP*/dH <  dP*/dH <  dP*/dH < 0 and d d d d d2 2 2 2 2P*/dH P*/dH P*/dH P*/dH P*/dH2 2 2 2 2 > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0. If so, for g  g  g  g  g ≡ dlnQ/dt  dlnQ/dt  dlnQ/dt  dlnQ/dt  dlnQ/dt, the
growth rate of sales, dg*/dH > 0 dg*/dH > 0 dg*/dH > 0 dg*/dH > 0 dg*/dH > 0 with d d d d d2 2 2 2 2g*/dH g*/dH g*/dH g*/dH g*/dH2 2 2 2 2 < 0  < 0  < 0  < 0  < 0 (cf. Margolis 1960,
Jennings 2008a).
[3] Knight (1921, esp. pp. 186-87) described the problem in his opening sentence
with clarity:
‘Great difficulties are met with in stating a clear and straightforward exposition of
price theory because of the fact that the given conditions or data of the problem are
so different according to the length of the time period which the explanation takes
into account. … The essential fact in economics is that different changes take place
at different rates, that for certain time periods certain aspects of the situation may
be assumed to remain unchanged, while for longer periods some of these will undergo
change. The data or given conditions are different when different periods of time are
under consideration.’
A helpful discussion of Marshall’s views in this regard can be found in Shackle
(1965, ch. 3, pp. 27-42); also cf. Frisch (1950). Stigler (1939, esp. pp. 306, 311-12,
and 320-21) closed his paper in a manner revealing the problem as
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‘… a complete presentation (for any given set of price anticipations) involves a third
axis, time, and the marginal and other cost functions become surfaces. … But … it is
no longer possible to handle the problem … by the use of plane geometry, since future
prices are now important variables.’
J. M. Clark (1940, esp. pp. 246-48) said “the whole functional relationship is
probably so complex as to defy mathematical plotting.” Then Clark (1955, esp. p.
459) noted that:
‘This complex of variables would overload any possible system of graphic
presentation. A family of three-dimensional surfaces – the third dimension being
time – with a different surface for each initial price or price situation, would still be
a simplification.’
Also cf. Turvey (1969, esp. pp. 285-87), who concluded on p. 287 that:
‘…The definition of marginal cost as the first derivative of cost with regard to output
is too simple to be useful. Both cost and output have time dimensions, and both may
be subject to uncertainty.’
[4] Waldrop (1992, pp. 150-51) quotes Brian Arthur’s response to “What is the
real problem with economics?” as “Chess!”
[5] In this case all of these products are complementary, competing with non-
party options.
[6] Cf. Jennings (1985, 2006). Friedman (1953, pp. 38-39), as quoted in Jennings
(1968, pp. 21-21), rejected Chamberlin’s framework on the grounds of the
impossibility of relaxing the industry designation:
‘… It would be highly desirable to have a more general theory than Marshall’s, one
that would cover at the same time both those cases in which differentiation of
product or fewness of numbers makes an essential difference and those in which it
does not… The theory of imperfect or monopolistic competition developed by
Chamberlin and Robinson is an attempt to construct such a more general theory…
The deficiencies of the theory are revealed most clearly in its treatment of, or
inability to treat, problems involving groups of firms – Marshallian “industries.” So
long as it is insisted that differentiation of product is essential – and it is the
distinguishing feature of the theory that it does insist on this point – the definition
of an industry in terms of firms producing an identical product cannot be used. By
that definition each firm is a separate industry. Definition in terms of “close”
substitutes or a “substantial” gap in cross-elasticities evades the issue, introducesThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:2 (2012) 29
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fuzziness and undefinable terms into the abstract model where they have no place,
and serves only to make the theory analytically meaningless – “close” and
“substantial” are in the same category as a “small” air pressure. In one connection
Chamberlin implicitly defines an industry as a group of firms having identical cost
and demand curves. But this, too, is logically meaningless so long as differentiation
of product is, as claimed, essential and not to be put aside. …
The theory of monopolistic competition offers no tools for the analysis of an
industry and so no stopping place between the firm at one extreme and general
equilibrium at the other. It is therefore incompetent to contribute to the analysis of a
host of important problems: the one extreme is too narrow to be of great interest; the
other, too broad to permit meaningful generalizations.’
Also cf. Hayek (1948, pp. 99-100), who covered this issue too:
‘We shall probably learn more about … the competitive process if … we forget about
the artificial assumptions … of perfect competition and ask whether competition
would be any less important if, for example, no two commodities were ever exactly
alike. If it were not for the difficulty of the analysis of such a situation, it would be
well worth while to consider in some detail the case where the different commodities
could not be readily classed into distinct groups, but where we had to deal with a
continuous range of close substitutes, every unit somewhat different from the other
but without any marked break in the continuous range. The result of the analysis of
competition in such a situation might in many respects be more relevant to the
conditions of real life than … the analysis of competition in a single industry
producing a homogeneous commodity sharply differentiated from all others. Or, if
the case where no two commodities are exactly alike be thought … too extreme, we
might at least turn to the case where no two producers produce exactly the same
commodity, as is the rule not only with all personal services but also in the markets
of many manufactured commodities…’
Chamberlin (1957, pp. 68-69) outlined a
‘… much simpler … formulation … [that] begins with the individual seller and uses
the spatial example to illustrate how the entire economic system may be viewed as an
elaborate network of interrelated firms… The group has disappeared from the
formulation here given … since the individual seller … is … isolated… The problem of
entry disappears along with the group, and becomes absorbed into the larger problem
of the distribution of resources throughout the entire economic system.’
[7] S S S S SI I I I I is only a simple summation if these agents are independent, which was
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[8] Our measure of ‘net interdependence’ in any group I I I I I with respect to member
j j j j j is S S S S SI I I I I =   =   =   =   = Ω Ω Ω Ω Ωs s s s si i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j, where compensation s s s s si i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j to or by each i i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j  j  j  j  j member is:
s s s s si i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j         ≡ (Q  (Q  (Q  (Q  (Qi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j/Q /Q /Q /Q /Qj j j j j)  )  )  )  ) • (P  (P  (P  (P  (Pi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j* - M * - M * - M * - M * - Mi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j*)  *)  *)  *)  *) • [  [  [  [  [ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij*/( */( */( */( */(ε ε ε ε εj j j j j*+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)], whose sign is the negative of
the cross-elasticity of demand for i i i i i with respect to j j j j j, ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij         ≡ dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j/dlnP /dlnP /dlnP /dlnP /dlnPj j j j j, where
own-elasticity of demand for j j j j j is ε ε ε ε εj j j j j*  *  *  *  * ≡ dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQ  dlnQj j j j j/dlnP /dlnP /dlnP /dlnP /dlnPj j j j j < -1  < -1  < -1  < -1  < -1. Then P P P P Pj j j j j* = P * = P * = P * = P * = Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′ + S  + S  + S  + S  + SI I I I I,
as explained.
[9] This expands the number of near-move contingencies to be projected, and also
weakens the planning incentives for a master player.
[10] An exception could be a jealous reaction to friends’ successful learning.
[11] P P P P Pj j j j j* = P * = P * = P * = P * = Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′ + S  + S  + S  + S  + SI I I I I for any group I I I I I of firms, where S S S S SI I I I I is the difference between
the compensated (joint-profit maximizing) P P P P Pj j j j j′ ′ ′ ′ ′ and the P P P P Pj j j j j* * * * * set independently of
its pecuniary impact on the other (i i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j) firms’ profits. Interhorizonal
complementarity means dH dH dH dH dHi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j*/dH */dH */dH */dH */dHj j j j j* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0. If so, then dS dS dS dS dSI I I I I/dH /dH /dH /dH /dHj j j j j* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0: an increase
in H H H H Hj j j j j* * * * * yields – through its contagious effects on H H H H Hi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j* * * * * – a shift of S S S S SI I I I I         away from
substitution in favor of complementarity. For any i i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j element of S S S S SI I I I I, namely
s s s s si i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j         ≡ (Q  (Q  (Q  (Q  (Qi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j/Q /Q /Q /Q /Qj j j j j) x (P ) x (P ) x (P ) x (P ) x (Pi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j* - M * - M * - M * - M * - Mi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j*) x [ *) x [ *) x [ *) x [ *) x [ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij*/( */( */( */( */(ε ε ε ε εj j j j j*+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)] *+1)], an extension of H H H H Hj j j j j* * * * * will
likely reduce the magnitude of both Q Q Q Q Qi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j/Q /Q /Q /Q /Qj j j j j > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0 (as a weighting scalar) and
(P (P (P (P (Pi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j* - M * - M * - M * - M * - Mi i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j*) > 0 *) > 0 *) > 0 *) > 0 *) > 0, while increasing own-elasticity (ε ε ε ε εj j j j j* * * * *) and thus the negative
magnitude of |||||( ( ( ( (ε ε ε ε εj j j j j*+1) < 0 *+1) < 0 *+1) < 0 *+1) < 0 *+1) < 0|||||, while the cross-elasticity (ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij* * * * *) is shifted away from
substitution (ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0) toward complementarity ( ( ( ( (ε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij* < 0 * < 0 * < 0 * < 0 * < 0), so d d d d dε ε ε ε εij ij ij ij ij*/dH */dH */dH */dH */dHj j j j j* < 0 * < 0 * < 0 * < 0 * < 0 as
well. So regardless of the sign of S S S S SI I I I I (as an aggregation of s s s s si i i i i≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠j j j j j across any group I I I I I
around member j j j j j), d d d d dS S S S SI I I I I/dH /dH /dH /dH /dHj j j j j* > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0 * > 0: a mutual lengthening of planning horizons
shifts our relations away from substitution in favor of complementarity (in
virtually all economic contexts).
[12] The goal of incentive alignment applies to all levels of organization. In a
business setting, “the biggest impediment to … integration of personal needs and
organizational considerations lies in managers’ lack of understanding about …
the ways self-interests shape … personal realities…” Two things affect the
economic efficiency of all management systems and group procedures: “The
concept alignment provides management with a model for understanding how
individuals attempt to fuse and integrate their personal needs with the needs of
the organization” (Culbert and McDonough, 1985, pp. 125-26 and 138-39; also cf.
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[13] E.g., cf. Arrow’s (1969), p. 495, dismissal of Negishi’s (1960-61) “model of
general monopolistic equilibrium” for making…
‘…the problem manageable by regarding the demand functions facing the monopolists
as those perceived by them, with only loose relations to reality. Such a theory would
have little in the way of deducible implications (unless there were a supplementary
psychological theory to explain the perceptions of demand functions) and certainly
no clear welfare implications.’
But also cf. note 1 above. As Polanyi (1958, pp. 139-42) put it: “The ideal of
strictly objective knowledge, paradigmatically formulated by Laplace, continues
to sustain a universal tendency to enhance the observational accuracy and
systematic precision of science, at the expense of its bearing on its subject
matter.” Georgescu-Roegen (1967, p. 104) remarked on this subject thus:
‘From time indefinite, the natural sciences have cherished a positivist epistemology
according to which scientific knowledge covers only those phenomena that go on
irrespective of whether they are observed or not. Objectivity … requires then that a
proper scientific description should not include man in any capacity whatsoever. This
is how some came to hold that even man’s thinking is not a phenomenon. True, the
ideal of a man-less science is gradually losing ground even in physics… However, for
a science of man to exclude altogether man from the picture is a patent incongruity.
Nevertheless, standard economics takes special pride in operating with a man-less
picture.’
[14] E.g., cf. Kohn (1986, pp. 55, 61-65, 108, 110, 113, 123, 129-31 and 143
without author’s original emphasis):
‘The simplest way to understand why competition generally does not promote
excellence is to realize that trying to do well and trying to beat others are two
different things. … Competition … precludes the more efficient use of resources that
cooperation allows. … Beyond the greater efficiency of cooperation, it is also true
that competition’s unpleasantness diminishes performance. … At best, the
stressfulness of a competitive situation causes us to try to avoid failure. And trying
to avoid failure is not at all the same thing as trying to succeed. …Competition does
not promote excellence. ... Whereas cooperation apparently contributes to high self-
esteem, competition often seems to have the opposite effect. … Psychological health
requires unconditionality… In competition, by contrast, self-esteem is conditional.
…Something very like an addiction is at work here…: the more we compete, the more
we need to compete. … In sum, the security that is so vital to healthy human
development is precisely what competition inhibits. …Competition does not promote …Frederic B. Jennings, Jr. 32
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substantial and authentic … individualism. On the contrary, it encourages rank
conformity [and] … dampens creativity. … Creativity is anticonformist at its core; it
is … a process of idiosyncratic thinking and risk-taking. Competition inhibits this
process … [and] affects the personality. Turning life into a series of contests turns
us into cautious, obedient people. … The chief result of competition … is strife.’
[15] As Hutchison (1977, p. 4) warned: “No kind of ignorance can be more
dangerous than ignorance regarding the limits and limitations of one’s
knowledge.” This sentiment was also expressed by Hayek (1955, p. 92): “It may
indeed prove to be far the most difficult and not the least important task for
human reason rationally to comprehend its own limitations.”
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